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A
mAbstract
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) is suitable for data access control
on a cloud storage system. In CP-ABE, the data owner encrypts data under the access
structure over attributes and a set of attributes assigned to users is embedded in user’s
secret key. A user is able to decrypt if his attributes satisfy the ciphertext’s access
structure. In CP-ABE, processes of user’s attribute revocation and grant are concentrated
on the authority and the data owner. In this paper, we propose a ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme delegating attribute revocation processes to Cloud
Server by proxy re-encryption. The proposed scheme does not require generations of
new secret key when granting attributes to a user and supports any Linear Secret
Sharing Schemes (LSSS) access structure. We prove that the proposed scheme is secure
against attack by unauthorized users and Cloud Server.
Keywords: Cryptographic cloud storage; Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption;
Attribute revocation and grant; Proxy re-encryptionBackground
Sharing of data on a cloud storage has a risk of information leakage caused by service
provider’s abuse. In order to protect data, the data owner encrypts data shared on the
cloud storage so that only authorized users can decrypt.
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [1,2] is suitable for data ac-
cess control in the cloud storage system. The authority manages the attributes in the
system. The data owner chooses an access structure and encrypts message under the
access structure. The set of attributes assigned to users is embedded in his secret key.
A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if his attributes satisfy the ciphertext’s access
structure.
There are user’s attribute revocation and grant in CP-ABE. In simple processes of
user’s attribute revocation, when his attributes are revoked, the data owner re-encrypts
the shared data so that revoked user cannot decrypt. Then, the authority redistributes
new secret keys so that other users can decrypt. In simple processes of user’s attribute
grant, the authority generates a new secret key. These simple processes are concen-
trated on the data owner and the authority.2015 Naruse et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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proposed a scheme combining CP-ABE with proxy re-encryption. The authority can
delegate re-encryption and secret key update to proxy servers. However, this scheme
has a limitation in access policy because it can only express “AND” policy. Hur et al.
[4] proposed a scheme using key encryption keys (KEKs). A service provider distributes
KEKs to each user. The service provider re-encrypts a ciphertext by an attribute group
key. Then, he encrypts attribute group key by using KEKs so that authorized user can de-
crypt. As the number of system users has increases, the number of KEKs also increases
and management becomes complicated. Liang et al. [5] proposed a scheme using user in-
formation (UI). UI is generated by Revocation Tree and Revocation List. An authorized
user can decrypt ciphertexts by using secret key and UI. In this scheme, users whose attri-
butes are revoked lose the access rights to all shared data by attribute revocation processes.
Moreover, in these schemes [3-5], the authority needs to generate a new key when
granting attribute to users.
In this paper, we propose a CP-ABE scheme delegating attribute revocation processes
to Cloud Server by proxy re-encryption and meets the following requirements.
1) Support any Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) access structure. In existing
schemes, there are following three expression methods of the access structure:
tree, vector and matrix.The schemes using tree (for example the schemes of [1,4]) are not given the security
proof under the standard model because they use hash functions for encryption.
The schemes using vector whose elements are combined by AND condition are
given the security proof under the standard model (for example the scheme of [3])
but they cannot perform flexible access control because only “AND” can be used
for decryption conditions.
By using matrix, for example a LSSS matrix, it is possible to use “AND” and “OR”
for decryption conditions, that is, it is possible to perform a fine-grained access
control and give the security proof under the standard model [2,5]. However, the
revocation function is not shown in [2], and the scheme of [5] can revoke the only
specified users but cannot revoke the only specified attributes.2) Revoke the only specified attribute (attribute level user revocation). In the scheme of
[5], users whose attributes are revoked lose the access rights to all shared data. To
perform a fine-grained access control of shared data, it is desirable to revoke the
only specified attributes. The schemes of [3,4] meet this requirement.
3) Does not require the generation of new secret key when granting attribute to user. In
the way that the authority generates a new secret key and sends the key to a user
every time it grants attributes to a user, the calculation amount of the authority is
large in the case attributes are frequently granted. To avoid focusing the process of
user’s attribute grant in the authority, we enable cloud servers to update user’s
secret key. As far as we know, there is no scheme that meets this requirement.
We prove that the proposed scheme is secure under the standard model. We define
attack model 1 as attack by unauthorized users and attack model 2 as attack by Cloud
Server. We prove the proposed scheme is IND-CPA secure in the standard model
against each attack model.
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Preliminaries
Bilinear Maps
Let G1,G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let P be a generator of G1. A bilinear
map is a map e :G1 ×G1→G2 with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all P,Q∈G1 and a, b∈ Zp, we have e(aP, bQ)→ e(P,Q)
ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: e(P, P) ≠ 1.
3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm tocompute e(P,Q) for all P,Q∈G1.
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS)
Definition 1 (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [2,6]) A secret-sharing scheme
Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if
1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2) There exists a matrix an M with l rows and n columns called the share-generating
matrix for Π. For all i = 1,…, l, te i’th row of M we let the function ρ defined the party
labeling row i as ρ(i). When we consider the column vector v = (s, r2,…, rn), where
s∈Zp is the secret to be shared, and r2,…, rn∈Zp are randomly chosen, then Mv is the
vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (Mv)i belongs to party ρ(i).
Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S∈A be any authorized set,
and let I ⊂ {1, 2,…, l}. Then, there exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i ∈ I such that, if {λi} are valid
shares of any secret s according to Π, then
X
i∈I
ωiλi ¼ s. Futhermore, there these constants
{ωi} can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix M [6].
Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption
Choose a group G1 of prime order p according to the security parameter. Let a, s,
b1,…, bq ∈ Zp be chosen at random and P ∈ G1 be a generator of G1. If an adversary
is given y
→¼















it must remain hard to distinguish e P;Pð Þaqþ1∈G2 from a random element in R ∈G2.
An algorithm A that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage ϵ in solving decisional q-parallel
BDHE in G1 if









We say that the (decision) q-parallel BDHE assumption holds if no polytime algorithmhas a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem [2].
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Model
There are four entities in the proposed scheme as follows.
User: The user downloads the shared data from Cloud Server.
Data owner: The data owner encrypts the shared data then uploads to Cloud Server.
Authority: The authority manages attributes in the system and publishes the parame-
ters used for encryption. It generates a secret key that user’s attributes are embedded
and PRE keys used for re-encryption and updating secret key. The authority is trusted
party.
Cloud Server: Cloud Server stores shared data. It re-encrypts encrypted shared data
and update secret key by using PRE keys received from the authority. Similar to previous
schemes [3,4], we assume Cloud Server to be curious-but-honest. That is, it will honestly
execute the tasks assigned by legitimate parties in the system. However, it would like to
learn information of encrypted shared data as much as possible.
Algorithm Definition
Our proposed scheme is composed of 8 algorithms: Auth.Setup, DO.Enc, Auth.Ext,
U.Dec, Auth.ReKeyGen, C.ReEnc, C.ReKey, C.AddAtt.
Auth.Setup: The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter and attribute
universe description. It outputs the public parameters PK, master secret key MSK and
the keys for granting an attribute J.
DO.Enc: The Encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, an LSSS
access structure A, and a messageℳ. It outputs a ciphertext CT.
Auth.Ext: The key extraction algorithm takes as input the master key MK, and a set
of attributes S. It outputs a secret key SK and tID.
U.Dec: The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key SK for a set S and a ci-
phertext CT for an access structure A . If the set of attributes S satisfies the access
structure A, it outputs a messageℳ.
Auth.ReKeyGen: The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input the mas-
ter key MK and a set of attributes γ for update. It outputs the redefined master key MK 0,
the redefined public parameters PK 0, and the PRE (Proxy Re-Encryption) keys rk.
C.ReEnc: The re-encryption algorithm takes as input an attribute y for update, the




C.ReKey: The key regeneration algorithm takes as input an attribute w for update,




C.GrantAtt: The attribute grant algorithm takes as input an attribute v, the key for
granting an attribute Jv, tID and the PRE key list RKLv. It outputs secret key component




We prove that unauthorized users and Cloud Server cannot decrypt ciphertext CT that
was encrypted by the proposed scheme. Since we assume Cloud Server is honest, we
do not consider active attacks from Cloud Server by colluding with unauthorized or re-
voked users. We define two attack models and security models as follows.
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this model is defined with the following game.
-Init. The adversary A submits the challenge access structure A to the challenger C.
-Setup. The challenger C runs setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to
the adversary A.
-Phase1. The adversary can issue following query.
 Ext query : The adversary A submits a set of attributes S where S does not satisfy the
access structure A to the challenger. The challenger C gives secret key corresponding S.
 Add query : The adversary A submits a set of attributes S 0 where S∪ S 0 does not
satisfy the challenge access structure A. The challenger C gives the secret key
component Kx corresponding to S
0.
-Challenge. The adversary A submits two equal length messages M0, M1. The
challenger flips a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under A. The challenger gives
ciphertext CT to the adversary A.
-Phase2. Phase1 is repeated.
-Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess b 0 of b.




Definition 2 A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is secure if all
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
Attack Model 2 In this model, we assume an attack by Cloud Server. Security in this
model is defined with the following game.
-Init. The adversary A submits the challenge access structure A and version number
ver* to the challenger C.
-Setup. The challenger C runs setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK and
PRE key and the keys for granting an attribute J to the adversary A.
-Phase1. The adversary can issue following query.
 Kx query : The adversary A submits a set of attribute S. The challenger C gives
secret key component Kx corresponding to S to the adversary A.
-Challenge. The adversary A submits two equal length messages M0, M1. The
challenger flips a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under A. The challenger gives
ciphertext CT to the adversary A.
-Phase2. Phase1 is repeated.
-Guess. The adversary A outputs his guess b 0 of b.Definition 3 A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is secure if all
polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
Our Scheme
Overview
The proposed scheme is based on Waters’s scheme of CP-ABE [2]. Water’s scheme
supports any LSSS access structure. We apply the idea of attribute revocation
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included in the ciphertext and secret key to delegate attribute revocation processes
to Cloud Server. The attribute key is master key components corresponding to each
attribute in the system. When user’s attributes are revoked, the authority re-defines
the attribute keys, and generates PRE keys for updating the attribute keys. Cloud
Server re-encrypts ciphertext and updates secret key by updating attribute key by
using PRE key. Each attribute is associated with version number for updating attri-
bute key.
Cloud Server keeps user list UL, re-encryption key list RKL and the key for
granting an attribute to secret key J. UL records user’s ID, user’s attribute informa-
tion, secret key components, tID. tID is a random number that randomize each
secret key to prevent users’ collusion attack. tID should “bind” components of one
user's key together so that they cannot be combined with another user's key com-
ponents[2]. RKL records update history of attribute (version number) and PRE
keys.
When granting attributes to users, Cloud Server generates user’s secret key com-
ponents correspond to granting attribute from tID and J, and sends secret key com-
ponent to the user. The user joins secret key component to own secret key. Thus,
it is possible to grant attributes to users without generation of new secret key by
the authority.
Algorithm
Auth.Setup(U) The setup algorithm takes as input the number of system attributes
U. It first chooses a group G1 of prime order p, a generator P ∈G1. It then chooses
random group elements Q1,…,QU ∈G1 that are associated with the U attributes in
the system. In addition, it chooses two random α, a ∈ Zp, and random Att1,…, AttU ∈ Zp as
the attribute key.
The public parameters are
PK :¼ < P; e P;Pð Þα; aP;Q1;…;QU ;T1 ¼ Att1P;…;TU >
The master key is MK : = < α, Att1,…, AttU >.
The keys for granting an attribute are J : = < {x, Jx = 1/Attx}1 ≤ x ≤U >.
DO.Enc (PK, (M, ρ),ℳ) The Encryption algorithm takes as input the public parame-
ters PK, an LSSS access structure (M, ρ), and a message ℳ. The function ρ associates
rows of M to attributes. Let M be an l × n matrix. It first chooses a random vector v
→¼
s; y2;…; ynð Þ∈Zp . For i = 1 to l, it computes λi :¼ v→ ⋅ Mi . It then chooses random r1,…,
rl ∈ Zp and outputs the ciphertext
CT :¼ < C;C 0 ; C1;D1ð Þ;…; Cl;Dlð Þ >¼
< Ke P; Pð Þαs; sP; λ1 aPð Þ−r1Qρ 1ð Þ; r1T ρ 1ð Þ
 




Auth.Ext (MK, S) The key extraction algorithm takes as input the master key MK,
and a set of attributes S. It first chooses a random tID ∈ Zp. It then outputs tID and the
secret key
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< αP þ tID aPð Þ; tIDP; ∀x∈S tID=Attxð ÞQx > :
U.Dec (SK,CT) The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key SK for a set S
and a ciphertext CT for access structure (M, ρ). Suppose that S satisfies the access struc-
ture and let I be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, let {ωi ∈ Zp}i ∈ I be as set of consistants
such that if {λi} are valid shares of the secret s according toM, then
X
i∈I ωiλi ¼ s.






e Ci; Lð Þe Di;K ρ ið Þ
  ωi ¼
e P;Pð Þαse P; Pð ÞastIDY
i∈I
e P; Pð Þtaλiωi
  ¼ e P; Pð Þαs:
It can then decrypt the messageℳ = C/e(P, P)αs.Auth.ReKeyGen(MK, γ) The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input
the master key MK and a set of attributes γ for update. For each x∈ γ, it chooses ran-
dom Att
0









then replaces each Attx of the master key component with Att
0
x , and each Tx of public
parameter with T
0
x . It outputs the redefined the master key MK ', the redefined public
parameters PK ', and the PRE keys rk := {x, rkx}x∈ γ.
C.ReEnc(y(=ρ(i)),Di, RKLy) The re-encryption algorithm takes as input an attribute y
(=ρ(i)) for update, the ciphertext component Di and a PRE key list RKLy. It first checks
version of attribute y. If y has the latest version, it outputs ⊥ and exit. Let Atty nð Þ be
defined as an attribute key of the latest version of attribute y. It computes rky↔y nð Þ :¼ r
ky↔y0⋅rky0↔y00 ⋅⋅⋅rky n−1ð Þ↔y nð Þ ¼ Atty nð Þ=Atty . Then, it outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext
component D
0
i :¼ rky↔y nð Þ⋅Di ¼ Atty nð Þ=Atty
 
⋅riAttyP ¼ riAtty nð ÞP.
C.ReKey (w, Kw,ID, RKLw) The key regeneration algorithm takes as input an attri-
bute w for update, the secret key component Kw and the PRE key list RKLw. It first
checks version of attribute w. If w has the latest version, it outputs ⊥ and exit. Let A
ttw nð Þ be defined as the attribute key for the latest version of attribute w. It computes
rkw↔w nð Þ :¼ rkw↔w0 ⋅rkw0↔w00 ⋅⋅⋅rkw n−1ð Þ↔w nð Þ ¼ Attw nð Þ=Attw . It then outputs the updated
secret key component K
0
w :¼ rk−1w↔w nð Þ ⋅Kw ¼ Attw=Attw nð Þð Þ⋅ tID=Attwð ÞQw ¼ tID=Attw nð Þð Þ
Qw.
C.GrantAtt (v, Jv, tID, RKLv) The attribute grant algorithm takes as input an attri-
bute v, the key for granting an attribute Jv, tID and the PRE key list RKLv. It first
checks version of attribute v. Let Attv nð Þ be defined as the attribute key for the latest
version of attribute v. It first computes rkv↔v nð Þ :¼ rkv↔v0 ⋅rkv0↔v00 ⋅⋅⋅rkv n−1ð Þ↔v nð Þ ¼ Attv nð Þ=A
ttv . It then outputs secret key component for Kv :¼ tID⋅rk−1v↔v nð Þ ⋅Jv ¼ tID⋅ Attv=Attv nð Þð Þ⋅
1=Attvð ÞQv ¼ tID=Attv nð Þð ÞQv and redefines the key for granting an attribute J
0
v :¼ rk−1v↔v nð Þ ⋅
Jv ¼ 1=Attv nð Þð ÞQv.
We show the flow of our scheme in Fig 1. In Fig 1, γ denotes a set of user u’s attri-
butes which are revoked and β denotes a set of attributes that granting to user u.
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We prove that unauthorized users and Cloud Server cannot decrypt ciphertext CT that
was encrypted by using the proposed scheme.
Security Proof in the Attack Model 1
Theorem 1 Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption holds and a challenge
matrix of size is l* × n* where l* × n* ≤ q, our scheme is IND-CPA secure in the attack
model 1.
Proof Suppose we have adversary A with non-negligible advantage ϵ against our
scheme in the attack model 1. Moreover, suppose it chooses a challenge matrix M* where
both dimensions are at most q. We show how to build a simulator, B, that plays the decisional
q-parallel BDHE problem.
Init. The simulator takes in a q-parallel BDHE challenge y→;T. The adversary gives
the simulator B the challenge access structure (M*, ρ*), where M* has n* columns.
Setup. The simulator B generates the public parameter PK as follows. The simulator
B chooses random α 0 ∈ Zp and implicitly sets α = α
0 + aq + 1 by letting e P;Pð Þα ¼ e
aP; aqPð Þe P;Pð Þα
0
. It outputs public parameter Q1,…,QU as follows.
1. For each x for 1 ≤ x ≤U begin by choosing a random value zx
2. Let X denote the set of indices i, such that ρ*(i) = x.
3. The simulator B computes











Note that if X =∅ then we have Qx ¼ gzx . Also note that the parameters are distrib-
uted randomly due to gzx . The simulator B randomly chooses attribute keys tx ∈ Zp forFigure 1 Flow of the proposed scheme.
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parameters PK := (P, e(P, P)α, aP, Q1,…,QU,T1,…,TU).
Phase1. The adversary A issues following queries:
Ext query : The adversary A submits a set of attributes S where S does not satisfy the
access structure M* to the challenger. The simulator first chooses a random r ∈ Zp.
Then it finds a vector w
→¼ w1;…;wnð Þ∈Znp such that w1 = − 1 and for all i where ρ(i) ∈
S ' we have that w
→ ⋅Mi ¼ 0. The simulator B begins by implicitly defining tID as
r þ w1aq þ w2aq−1 þ⋯þ wnaq−nþ1
It performs this by setting L ¼ rP þ
X











The simulator B computes Kx ∀x ∈ S as follows.
Case 1. If there is no i such that ρ*(i) = x, it computes Kx = (1/tx) ⋅ zxL.
Case 2. If there is i such that ρ*(i) = x.
1) Let X be the set of all i such that ρ*(i) = x.

















3) It calculates Kx ¼ 1=txð ÞK 0x.It gives the adversary A secret key SK := (K, L, ∀ x ∈ S Kx).
Add query : The adversary A submits a set of attributes S 0 where S ∪ S 0 does not sat-
isfy the challenge access structure M*.The simulator B computes Kx ∀x ∈ S
0 as follows.
Case1. If there is no i such that ρ*(i) = x, it computes Kx = (1/tx) ⋅ zxL.
Case2. If there is i such that ρ*(i) = x.
1) Let X be the set of all i such that ρ*(i) = x.



















3) It calculates Kx ¼ 1=txð ÞK 0 .x
It gives the adversary A the secret key component Kxf g∀x∈S0 .
Challenge. The adversary A submits two equal length messages ℳ0, ℳ1. The
simulator B flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}. It computes C =ℳbT ⋅ e(sP, α ' P),




n∈Zp and the share the secret using the vector
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For i = 1,…, n*, we define Ri as the set of all k ≠ i such that ρ*(i) = ρ*(k). The challenge
ciphertext components are then generated as



















It gives the adversary A the challenge ciphertext CT  ¼ C;C 0 ; C1;D1ð Þ;…; Cl ;Dlð Þ
 
.
Phase2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. The adversary A will eventually output a guess b 0. of b. The simulator then
outputs 0 to guess that T ¼ e P; Pð Þaqþ1s if b 0. = b; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate that
it believes T is a random group element R ∈G2.
When T is a tuple the simulator B gives a perfect simulation so we have that







When T is a random group element the message ℳb is completely hidden from the




¼ 12 . Therefore, the simulator B can
play the decisional q-parallel BDHE game with non-negligible advantage.
Security Proof in the Attack Model 2
Theorem 2 Suppose Waters’s scheme [2] is IND-CPA secure, our scheme is also
IND-CPA secure in the attack model 2.
Proof Suppose we have adversary A with non-negligible advantage ϵ against our
scheme in the attack model 2. Moreover, suppose it chooses a challenge matrix M*
where both dimensions are at most q. We prove there is an simulator B which has ad-
vantage at least ϵ against Waters’s scheme simulator (Given input, it responds accord-
ing to algorithms of the Waters’s scheme).
Init. The adversary A submits the challenge access structure (M*, ρ*) where M* has
n* columns and version number ver* to the simulator B. The simulator B submits the
challenge access structure (M*, ρ*) to the Waters’s scheme simulator.
Setup. The simulator B receives public parameters PK' := (P, e(P, P)α, aP,Q1,…,QU) from
the Waters’s scheme simulator. It randomly chooses attribute keys tx ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ x ≤U
and computes public parameters Τx = txP. It computes the key for granting an attri-
bute J := {(1/t1)Q1,…, (1/tU)QU}. Then, the simulator B computes PRE keys and public
parameters Tx for each version as follows. For x (1 ≤ x ≤U), for 1 ≤ k ≤ ver* − 1, the
simulator B randomly chooses PRE keys rkx kð Þ→x kþ1ð Þ∈Zp and computes public parame-
ters Tx kþ1ð Þ ¼ rkx kð Þ↔x kþ1ð ÞTx kð Þ . (k + 1) and (k) denote the version number of PRE keys
and public parameter. The simulator B gives the adversary A the public parameter
PK := (P, e(P, P)α, aP,Q1,…,QU,T1,…, TU), the key for granting an attribute J and all
PRE keys.
Phase1. The adversary A issues following queries:
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1. we denote Vx kð Þ ¼
Yk
i¼2
rkx i−1ð Þ↔x ið Þ . The simulator B randomly chooses tID ∈ Zp and
computes ∀x∈S Kx ¼ tID=tx⋅ Vx kð Þð ÞQx . It gives the adversary A the secret key compo-
nents {Kx}∀ x ∈ S.
Challenge. The adversary A submits two equal length messages ℳ0, ℳ1, then the
simulator B submits them to the Waters’s simulator. The Waters’s simulator flips a ran-
dom coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes ciphertest CT 0 := (C,C 0, (C1,D1),…, (Cl,Dl))← Enc
(PK, (M*, ρ*),ℳb). The simulator B receives the ciphertext CT
', then it computes
CT :¼ C;C 0 ; C1;V ρ 1ð Þ verð ÞD1
 
;…; Cl;V ρ lð Þ verð ÞDl
 
from the ciphertext CT 0. It
gives the adversary A the cipertext CT.
Phase2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. The adversary A outputs will eventually output a guess b 0 of b. The simulator
B outputs b 0 as its guess.
The simulation above shows there is a simulator B that has advantage at least ϵ
ageinst Waters’s scheme simulator if there is an adversary A that has advantage ϵ
against our scheme.Result and discussion
In Table 1, we give two comparisons of the proposed scheme with the schemes of [3,4]
that can revoke the only specified attributes. The first comparison is in terms of the
size of the public key (PK), the secret key (SK), the ciphertext (CT), and the re-
encryption key (RK). The second comparison is in terms of the computation amount of
encryption (Enc), secret key generation (Ext), re-encryption (Re-enc), decryption (Dec),
and secret key update (Re-key). As to the size of the public key, the scheme of [4] has
the smallest one, followed by the proposed scheme. As for the size of the secret key,Table 1 Key Size, Ciphertext Size and Computation Amount
Yu etal’s scheme [3] Hur et al’s scheme [4] The proposed scheme
PK 3 Uj j þ 1ð Þ  Gj j þ jGT j 2 × |G| + |GT| 2 Uj j þ 2ð Þ  Gj j þ jGT j
SK (2|U| + 1) × |G| 2 Sj j þ 1ð Þ  Gj j þ log Nj j  jKj (|S| + 2) × |G|
CT Uj j þ 1ð Þ þ Gj j þ jGT j 2 Ij j þ 1ð Þ  Gj j þ jGT j 2 Ij j þ 1ð Þ  Gj j þ jGT j
RK r|U| × |Zp| (2|N| − 1) × |K| r|U| × |Xp|
Enc (|U| + 2) × exp (2|I| + 2) × exp (2|I| + 2) × exp
Ext (2|U| + 1) × exp (2|S| + 2) × exp (|S| + 2) × exp
Re-enc |RCT| × exp |RCT| × exp |RCT| × exp
Re-key |RSK| × exp |RSK| × exp |RSK| × exp
Dec
Uj j þ 1ð Þ  e^
þ Uj j1ð Þ  exp
2 Rj j þ 1ð Þ  e^
þ 2 Rj j þ 2ð Þ  exp
2 Rj j þ 1ð Þ  e^
þ 2 Rj j þ 2ð Þ  exp
Exp:ex ponentiation in G, ê: bilinear pairing,
|U|: the number of attributes defined in the system,
|S|: the number of attributes in user’s key,
|R| the number of user’s attributes satisfying an acces structure,
r: the number of times the attribute revocation event occurs,
|RSK|: the number of updated attributes (secret key),
|RCT|: the numbet of updated attributes (ciphertext), |N|: the number of total user,
|I|: the number of attributes am acces structure, |K|: size of the common key.
Table 2 Comparison of Schemes




‘AND’ ‘AND’, ‘OR’ Any LSSS Any LSSS
Attibute level
user revoction




a new secret key
The authority generates
a new secret key
The authority generates
a new secret key
Cloud server
adds attributes
to user’s secret key
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of [4] have equally the smallest size ciphertexts. As to the size of the re-encryption key,
if there are users more than the number of attributes, both the proposed scheme and
the scheme of [3] have the equally smallest one.
As for the computation amount of encryption and decryption, the proposed scheme
and the scheme of [4] have the equally smallest. As to the computation amount of se-
cret key generation, the proposed scheme has the smallest. Finally, as to the computa-
tion amount of re-encryption and secret key update, all schemes have the same.
The differences, in terms of the requirements in Section I, between the proposed
scheme and the schemes of [3-5] are summarized as shown in Table 2.
Conclusion
This paper proposed a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme delegating
attribute revocation processes to Cloud Server by proxy re-encryption. Cloud Server
re-encrypts a ciphertext and updates a secret key by updating attribute key with PRE
key for updating the attribute keys.
The proposed scheme meets three requirements as follows; First, the proposed
scheme supports any LSSS access structure. Second, the authority can only revoke
specified attribute by updating attribute key included in ciphertext corresponding to his
attributes which are revoked. Finally, when granting attributes to a user, generation of a
new secret key becomes unnecessary because Cloud Server generates secret key com-
ponents corresponding to granting attributes.
The proposed scheme is secure against attack by unauthorized users and Cloud
Server. Our future direction is to implement the proposed scheme and confirm its
feasibility.
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